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ABSTRACT: Unemployment benefits, benefit duration, base period and qualifying 
period are constituent parameters of the unemployment insurance system in most 
OECD countries. From economic research we know that the amount and duration 
of unemployment benefits increase unemployment. To analyze the effects of the 
other two parameters we use a matching model with search frictions and show 
that there is a trade-off between the qualifying and the base period on the one 
hand and the amount and duration of the unemployment benefits on the other. A 
country that combines a high level of unemployment benefits with a long benefit 
duration can neutralize the effect on the equilibrium rate of unemployment with a 
long qualifying and/or a short base period. 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: Lohnersatzleistungen, Anspruchsdauern, Rahmenfristen und 
Anwartschaftszeiten sind konstituierende Parameter der Arbeitslosenversicherun-
gen in den meisten OECD Ländern. Ökonomische Untersuchungen zeigen, dass 
Höhe und Dauer der Lohnersatzleistungen die Arbeitslosigkeit erhöhen. Im Rah-
men eines Matching-Modells untersuchen wir die Wirkung der anderen beiden 
Parameter und zeigen, dass ein trade-off zwischen der Anwartschaftszeit und der 
Rahmenfrist auf der einen und der Höhe und der Dauer der Lohnersatzleistungen 
auf der anderen Seite existiert. Ein Land mit einer hohen Arbeitslosenunter-
stützung und langer Anspruchsdauer kann die Wirkung auf die Arbeitslosenquote 
durch eine lange Anwartschaftszeit und eine kurze Rahmenfrist neutralisieren. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Base and qualifying period are constituent parameters of the unemployment 
insurance system in most of the OECD countries. A worker must complete the 
qualifying period within a statutory base period in order to obtain a claim for 
unemployment benefits (UB). The qualifying period is often described as a rule 
having a financing and an information function, which reduces the moral hazard of 
the unemployed. The longer the qualifying period, the lower the likelihood that 
workers will register as ‘false’ unemployed to capture UB and the higher the 
accumulated contributions to the unemployment insurance, when they once will 
claim benefit payments. Table 1 shows the qualifying and the base period of the 
US, Great Britain, Japan, and some of the Continental European countries. For 
example, Italy and Germany apply a rule, where a worker must have been 
employed at least for 12 months during the last 2 years in order to be eligible for 
UB. The qualifying period is much shorter in France and the Netherlands than in 
Germany or Italy; this is also true for the base period in the Netherlands. 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of the unemployment insurance system 










Denmark  12 36 48 
France 4  18  30 
Germany  (2006)  12 24 12 
Italy 12  24  6 
Japan 6  12  10 
Netherlands 6  9 18 
Spain  12 72 24 
UK 24  n.a.  6 
USA (2006)  12  16  6 
1)  for a 40 year old single worker without children, with 
22-year employment career, Source: OECD 2004, US 
Department of Labor 
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Of the four parameters – base period, qualifying period, UB and benefit duration – 
we know from economic theory (Mortensen 1977, Mortensen and Pissarides 1999, 
Pissarides 2000, Rogerson et. al 2005) and empirical research (Atkinson and 
Micklewright 1991, Layard et al. 1991, Nickell and Layard 1999, Nickell et al. 
2005) that the amount and the duration of UB increase the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment. While the literature has focused on the impact of the amount and 
duration of UB on the unemployment rate, there seems to be neither theoretical 
nor empirical research on the base and the qualifying period. To analyze the 
effects of the two parameters, we use a Mortensen-Pissarides type (MP) matching 
model with search frictions (Mortensen and Pissarides 1994, Pissarides 2000) and 
show that there exists a trade-off between the qualifying period and the base 
period, on the one hand, and the amount and the duration of UB, on the other. 
Therefore, it is possible for a country to offer its job seekers a high level of UB with 
a  long benefit duration, while neutralizing the effect on the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment with a long qualifying period and/or a short base period. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the MP-model with a finite 
benefit duration. In Section 3, we integrate the base period and the qualifying 
period into the modified MP-model. Section 4 presents numerical simulations. 
Section 5 concludes. A graphical presentation of the simulation results can be 
found in the Appendix I. Appendices II-IV present the proofs of the propositions.  
2. BENEFIT DURATION T 
The time structure of the model is discrete. Job creation takes place at the 
beginning of a period and job destruction at the end of a period. At the beginning 
of a period, a continuum of applicants look for suitable vacancies. When a worker 
and a vacancy meet, they negotiate the employment contract and begin 
production. At the end of the period, the output is sold, the wage is paid and the 
match partners decide on whether to continue the job. Idiosyncratic shocks which 
are caused by shifts in product demand or by a change of the unit costs of 
production affect the productivity of the match. If the productivity is too low, the job 
is destroyed and the worker becomes unemployed. Eligible job seekers receive 
UB, which are paid as a flat rate at the end of a period. 
 
The labor force is represented as a unit mass, each worker is either employed or 
unemployed, hence  u e + = 1 , where e denotes the pool of employed and u the 
pool of unemployed. Out of the e employed,  ( )e R G λ  lose their job at the end of a 
period.  ) (R G λ  is the endogenous separation rate, where λ is the probability of a   5
job-specific shock x.  () x G , with the support  1 0 ≤ ≤ ≤ x α , is the distribution function 
of x.  α ≥ R  is the endogenous reservation productivity and  yx  is the real output of 
the job, with the maximum productivity  0 > y . Worker and firm prefer the same 
separation rule: If  R x ≥ , the job is continued. If  R x < , the job is destroyed. Since 
R is endogenous and x is bounded from below, worker and firm can avoid job 
destruction by agreeing on the reservation productivity  α = R . The u job seekers 
apply if they meet a vacancy. Job seekers apply at most once per period and 
vacancies receive no more than one application. 
 
Unemployment incidence. Job search takes place at the beginning of a period. Job 
seekers, who lost their job at the end of the previous period and do not find a re-
engagement, form the inflow I of the pool of unemployed:  ( )( ) e R G p I λ − ≡ 1 , where 
p is the transition probability into employment,  1 0 < < p . We call () ( ) R G p λ − 1  the 
ex-post-incidence. The unemployment incidence  ( ) R G λ  comprises, in addition to 
the  ex-post-incidence, job seekers who find a re-engagement immediately after 
losing their previous job, as  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) R G p R G p R G λ λ λ − + = 1 , where  () R G pλ  is the 
fraction of the job-to-job transitions. 
 
Unemployment Insurance. Workers without a job register with the unemployment 
insurance [] b T, , which has the following two properties.  
 
(A1) [Employed Worker]. As in the MP-model each employed worker is entitled 
to claim UB  0 > b  if laid off. In contrast to the MP-model the benefit duration is 
limited to  0 ≥ T  periods. 
 
(A2) [Job Seekers].  j T u −  is the pool of job seekers with a residual benefit 
duration of  0 ≥ − j T  periods. j is the current spell of unemployment,  T j , , 0 K = . An 
additional period of unemployment raises the current spell from j to  1 + j  periods, 
reduces the counter of the residual claims to  ( ) 0 1 ≥ + − j T  and places the 
unemployed into pool  () 1 + − j T u . Job seekers, who have not found a job T or more 
periods after losing their previous employment, lose their eligibility to UB and form 
the job seeker pool  0 u . 
 
2.1 Equilibrium Rate of Unemployment 
 
Job seekers from the pool  T u , who lost their job at the end of the previous period, 
are entitled to UB for T periods. From (A1) and (A2) it follows that the inflow I is 
identical to the pool  T u , so that  ( ) ( )e R G p uT λ − = 1 . Those job seekers from  T u , 
who still have no job at the succeeding period, form by (A2) the pool  1 − T u . For the   6
pool of job seekers with a counter of residual claims equal to  j T − , we have in the 
steady state 





− − = ,  1 , , 0 − = T j K .  
Since  1 < p ,  j T u −  strictly decreases with an increasing spell length j. 
Of the unemployed in the pool  0 u ,  0 pu  find a job. Thus we have in the steady 
state:  = 0 pu  () ( ) e R G p
T λ
1 1
+ − . From this steady state condition, we can derive  0 u   










= .  
Finally, we obtain the aggregate pool of job seekers u from 





j T u u
0
. 
Matching function. The labor market is a search market.  ( ) v u m ,  represents the 
matching technology of the market, where m is the number of jobs filled with an 
input of u job seekers and v vacancies. The matching function is linear 
homogenous, concave and monotone in both arguments. For a given vacancy, 
() () ( ) v v u m m q , 1 , 1 = ≡ θ θ  is the probability of an application, where the ratio of 
vacancies to job seekers,  u v = θ , is the tightness of the labor market. For a given 
job seeker,  () () θ θ θ q p =  is the transition probability into employment. For 
convenience, we will write  ( ) θ q q =  and  ( ) θ p p = . 
 
Inserting (1) and (2) into (3) gives the equilibrium rate of unemployment as a 
function of the tightness and the reservation productivity 
(4)  () ( ) [ ] ( )
() [] () () θ λ θ
λ θ
θ









The parameters of the unemployment insurance T and b do not affect u directly, 
but rather through the ex-post-incidence,  ( ) ) ( 1 R G p λ −  and the duration of 
unemployment,  p 1 .  
 
2.2 Job Creation 
 
Filled Jobs. An employment contract  ( ) ] , , [ R x w w j T−  has three components.  j T w −  is 
the outside wage the worker earns in the first period. The outside wage depends 
on the residual claims of the job seeker. If the negotiations fail, the worker receives 
UB b for up to another  j T −  periods,  T j , , 0 K = .    7
The second component of the contract is the match specific inside wage with the 
wage function  []ℜ → 1 , : R w . At the end of a period, the succeeding periods’ 
productivity yx is revealed to the match. If  [ ] 1 , R x∈ , the match is continued and the 
worker gets paid  () x w .
1 The third component of the contract shows the reservation 
productivity R at which the job will be destroyed. 
 
Continuation periods. Job-specific shocks hit a match with probability  0 ≥ λ . A job 
will be affected by no more than one shock per period, where shocks are iid. 
 
Let  () x Π  be the present value of a filled job after the manifestation of  [] 1 , α ∈ x . 
Worker and firm are both interested in continuing the match as long as  () 0 ≥ x Π  
and agree on job destruction as soon as  ( ) 0 < x Π , as will be shown below. Since 
() x Π  is a continuously increasing function of x, a reservation threshold R exists, for 
which 
(5)  () 0 = R Π . 
Only jobs with  R x ≥  will be continued. 
 
We assume that the firm sells the output yx at the end of the period at the same 
time as it pays the wage  () x w . Then the steady state equation for the present 
value  () x Π  is 







− + ∫ + − = x h dG h x w yx x
R
Π λ Π λ ρ Π 1
1
. 
Flow and stock variables are discounted at the factor ρ , where  () 1 1 1 0 < + = < r ρ  
with the real interest rate  0 > r . The job is hit by a shock with probability λ  and 
changes into state h. If  1 ≤ ≤ h R , the match is continued and the continuation 
value becomes  ( ) h Π . The match specific productivity does not change with 
probability  λ − 1 . 
 
A worker employed at the productivity x earns the wage  ( ) x w , and his human 
capital has the present value  () x W . The asset pricing equation for the worker is  













+ ∫ + = x W U R G h dG h W x w x W T
R
λ λ ρ 1
1
. 
                                            
1  Mortensen/Pissarides (1999) and Pissarides (2000) present a discussion of objections against 
the plausibility of this assumption and the two-tier wage structure which results from the 
possibility of renegotiation.   8
With probability λ  a shock arrives and the match draws the productivity h. If 
R h ≥ , the value of the worker is  ( ) h W  and the match continues. If, on the other 
hand,  R h < , which happens with probability  ( ) R G , the job is destroyed, the worker 
becomes unemployed and the value of his human capital is  T U  (see Equation 
(13)). 
 
Initial period. Firms choose the initial productivity  1 = x  when they set up a match 
and negotiate the outside wage. If the firm meets a worker with a current spell of 
unemployment of length j, then the market value  j T− Π  of the newly filled job is  
(8)  ( ) ( ) ] 1 [ 1 j T j T w w − − − + = ρ Π Π ,  T j , , 0 K = , 
where  j T w −  is the outside wage,  ( ) 1 Π  is the continuation value (6) and  ) 1 ( w  is the 
inside wage of a job with the productivity  1 = x . 
The market value of an entrant with a current spell of unemployment of length j is 
with respect of the asset Equation (7) and the outside wage  j T w − : 
(9)  ( ) ( )] 1 [ 1 w w W W j T j T − + = − − ρ ,  T j , , 0 K = . 
Job creation. Entrance into the labor market is free for all vacancies, but open only 
at the beginning of a period. The flow of vacancies persists until the present value 
of a vacancy is zero. Considering this infinitely elastic supply of vacancies, the job 
creation condition is 





j T j T q k
0
0 Π μ , 
where k denotes the flow costs for advertising a vacancy, q is the probability of 
meeting a job seeker,  j T− μ  the conditional probability that the applicant will have a 
current spell of unemployment of length j and  j T− Π  the value of the newly filled 
job according to Equation (8). 
 
All job seekers search for jobs with the same intensity. Therefore,  u u j T j T − − = μ  
denotes the probability with which a vacancy will meet a job seeker with a current 
spell of unemployment of length j. Taking into account the pool Equations (1), (2) 















1 , , 0 , 1 K
μ  
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2.3 Wage Negotiation and Job Destruction 
 
Value of unemployment. Unemployed who are not eligible for UB have the value 
0 U , where in the steady state 
(12)  ( ) ( ) 0 0 0 1 U z p pW U + − + = ρ . 
The job seeker finds a job with probability p, and his human capital takes on the 
initial value  0 W  (see Equation (9)). If he is not matched, the utility from leisure is 
equal to z.  
 
The human capital of a job seeker with a current spell of unemployment of length j 
has the value  j T U − . In the steady state, the first-order linear inhomogeneous 
difference equation for  j T U −  is 
(13)  () () ] [ 1 1 + − − − + + − + = j T j T j T U b z p pW U ρ ,  1 , , 0 − = T j K . 
The human capital of the outsider, who meets a vacancy, has the value  j T W −  (see 
Equation (9)). If the job seeker does not meet a vacancy, he receives the UB b in 
addition to the utility of leisure z, the counter of the current spell of unemployment 
increases to  1 + j  and his human capital takes on the value  () 1 + − j T U . 
 
Wage negotiations. Job search takes time and causes search costs. Therefore, as 
a consequence of search frictions, each match generates a positive monopoly 
rent, which is distributed between the match partners through the wage. The 
sharing rule is obtained according to the generalized Nash solution to a bargaining 
problem, with  () 1 , 0 ∈ β  denoting the bargaining strength of the job seeker. 
 
Taking into account the idiosyncratic productivity shock  [ ] 1 , R x∈ , the reservation 
utility of the insider  T U , and the fact that the asset price of a vacancy is equal to 
zero in the steady state, the sharing rule implemented by the negotiations with an 
insider is 







() T U x W −  denotes the worker’s contribution and  ( ) x Π  the firm’s contribution to 
the total surplus of the job. 
 
The job rent of a match with an outsider, who has a current spell of unemployment 
of length j, will be shared according to the following rule   10





,  T j , , 0 K = , 
where the asset Equations (8), (9), (12) and (13) give the initial values of the 
outsider,  j T W − , the newly filled job,  j T− Π , and the value of the unemployed at the 
time of wage negotiations,  j T U − . Proves of the following lemmas 1. – 3. can be 
found in Appendix II. 
 
Lemma 1 [Bargained Wages]. In view of the reservation income  T rU  of the insider and 
the value  j T U −  of the job seekers with a current spell of unemployment of length j, the 
agents negotiate the following inside and outside wages.  
(i) [Inside Wage] The bargained inside wage at a match specific productivity  [] 1 , R x∈  is  
(16)   () ( ) T T rU yx rU x w − + = β . 
(ii) [Outside Wage] An outsider with a current spell of unemployment of length j, who 
produces in the first period with productivity  1 = x , earns the wage 
(17)   () ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 −
− − − − − = ρ β j T T j T U U w w ,  T j , , 0 K = , 
where  () 1 w  is the inside wage (16) for  1 = x , and  r + =
− 1
1 ρ . 
 
By Equation (16) the inside wage equals the reservation income of the worker plus 
a share of the current match rent that depends on his bargaining strength β. 
Should an outsider with a current spell of unemployment of length j find a job, then 
the guarantee value of his human capital increases by the amount of the 
differential rent  j T T U U − − . As the wage Equation (17) illustrates, the firm which 
places the outsider under contract takes the fraction  β − 1  of this rent. 
 
The job destruction condition can be derived by evaluating the asset Equation (6) 
at the reservation threshold  R x =  to obtain: 
 
Lemma 2 (i) [Filled Jobs]. The continuation value of a filled job producing with the 
idiosyncratic productivity  [] 1 , R x∈  is 








β Π 1 . 
 
(ii) [Job Destruction Rule]. The job destruction rule is 












As the job destruction condition (19) illustrates, the current reservation output of a 
match is lower than its permanent reservation income. Since the firm can destroy 
the job at no charge (free disposal) and the supply of vacancies is infinitely elastic, 
the reservation income of the match is identical with the reservation wage of the   11
worker,  T rU . Therefore, when the job produces the reservation output yR, the 
match suffers a current loss equal to the integral expression in (19). The option 
value of the filled job is the reason why the match partners are willing to accept 
this loss. 
 
In order to close the model, we still have to determine the reservation wage of the 
different types of unemployed. The unemployment insurance [] b T,  creates a 
discrete distribution with  1 + T  types in the pool of job seekers. The job seekers 
differ with respect to their residual entitlement to UB and in turn in their reservation 
utility and the outside wages they are able to demand when matched to a vacancy. 
Given the distribution of the market values of the  1 + T  job seeker types, we finally 
can derive the distribution of the initial values of the filled jobs. 
 
Lemma 3 (i) [Reservation Wage]. From the asset equations for the job seekers, the 
sharing rules and the equations for the initial values, we obtain the distribution of the 
reservation wage of the  1 + T  job seeker types with 





− − − +
− −





j T U U
p
p
b d z rU ,  T j , , 0 K =  
where  () () []














(ii) [Initial Values]. The distribution of the initial values of occupied jobs is obtained from 
(21)     ( )( ) ( ) j T T j T U U − − − − + = β Π Π 1 1 ,  T j , , 0 K = . 
 
As (20) and (21) show, while, ceteris paribus, the reservation wage of a job seeker 
with a current spell of unemployment of length j decreases, the value of a job filled 
with an outsider with the same current spell increases monotonically with j. As a 
result, the unemployed without benefit entitlement from pool  0 u  have the lowest 
market value of all job seekers, while correspondingly jobs filled by unemployed 
workers without entitlement have the highest market value of all newly formed 
jobs.  
 
2.4 Solution and Labor Market Policy 
 
The equilibrium of the search model consists of solutions  () ] , , , , 1 [ u R U j T θ Π − , 
= j T , , 0 K , to the Equations (10), (18) – (20) and the equilibrium unemployment 
rate (4). Like the standard MP-model the enhanced model has two independent 
endogenous variables, the reservation productivity R and the labor market 
tightness  θ. To solve for these two unknowns we can use the job destruction 
condition (19), which is in view of the income Equation (20) and the asset Equation   12
(18) an equation in  ] , [ R θ . The second key equation of the model is the job 
creation condition (10), which depends after eliminating the transition probabilities 
with (11) and the initial values of a filled job with the asset Equations (21) on 
] , [ R θ . The asset Equations (20) and (21) make use of the ‘entitlement rents’ 
j T T U U − − ,  T j , , 1K = . The entitlement rents result from ‘institutional frictions’, 
which are created by the public unemployment insurance system. All the T 
entitlement rents are functions of the labor market tightness, as follows from the 
asset Equations (20).  
 
Labor Market Policy. The following proposition characterizes the impact of the 
policy parameter T. An increase in the benefit duration T raises the fraction of job 
seekers with a long residual duration of benefit entitlement. Their reservation wage 
increases and, consequently, the outside wages they demand increase too. The 
initial values of the newly established firms fall and the supply of vacancies 
declines. In turn, the tightness of the labor market decreases and the duration of 
unemployment  p 1  rises. In addition, the ex-post-incidence  () ( ) R G p λ − 1  
increases. The rising duration of unemployment and the higher ex-post-incidence 
are each sufficient to raise the equilibrium rate of unemployment. The Figures 3a–
c in Appendix I for  1 = E  illustrate the argument. 
3. QUALIFYING PERIOD AND BASE PERIOD 
In the unemployment insurance [ ] b T F E , , ,  with qualifying period  2 ≥ E  and base 
period  E F ≥ , workers who lose their job before completing the qualifying period 
have no claim to UB. In order to model the insurance, we introduce the following 
five assumptions (A1) – (A5), where (A1) – (A4) deal with the qualifying period E 
and (A5) describes the role of the base period F. 
 
3.1 Qualifying Period E 
 
(A1) [Completed Qualifying Period]. The qualifying period of a worker is 
completed, if he was employed for at least  2 ≥ E  periods during the base period F. 
An unemployed person with a completed qualifying period is entitled to T 
payments of the UB b.  
 
(A2) [Transferability]. Residual claims for UB from earlier unemployment spells 
are lost. Qualifying points are intertemporally transferable.  
   13
(A3) [Employed worker]. Each employed worker is characterized by a tupel 
] , [ C i E − . The counter  0 ≥ −i E  shows the number of currently accumulated 
qualifying points of the worker; i denotes the number of uncompleted qualifying 
time periods, with  , , 0 K = i 1 − E  and  { } T C , 0 ∈  is a binary variable and either equal 
to T or zero – depending on whether the qualifying period is completed and the 
worker is entitled to UB or not. During an uncompleted qualifying period, an 
additional period of employment raises the counter of the qualifying points from 
i E −  to  () E i E ≤ − − 1 . 
 
(A4) [Job Seekers]. Each job seeker is characterized by a tupel [] j T i E − − , : The 
counter  0 ≥ −i E  shows the number of currently accumulated qualifying points and 
0 ≥ − j T  the residual benefit duration, where  T j , , 0 K = . An additional period of 
unemployment of a job seeker, who still owns residual benefit claims, raises the 
length of the current spell of unemployment from j to 1 + j  and reduces the counter 
for the residual benefit duration from  j T −  to  ( ) 0 1 ≥ + − j T . 
 
3.2 Base Period F and Waiting Time 
 
With given UB b the reservation utility of an applicant, his initial wage as well as 
the initial market value of a filled job depend on the following three attributes of the 
insurance system [ ] b T F E , , , : First, the accumulated qualifying points  i E − ; 
second, the distribution of the  i E −  employment periods over the base period F;  
and  third, the counter of the residual benefit duration  j T − . The longer the 
residual benefit duration, or the higher the number of accumulated qualifying 
points, or the sooner the job seeker will complete the qualifying period (i.e. the 
shorter his waiting time), the higher his wage demand will be during the initial 
contract negotiations. 
 
The length of the waiting time of a job seeker with characteristics  , [ i E − ] j T −  is 
the time that passes until his next benefit entitlement begins. The waiting time is a 
random variable, which depends on the accumulated qualifying points  i E −  and 
on the distribution of the  i E −  employment periods over the base period F, as we 
will explain in more detail in the following sections. The longer F is, the greater, 
ceteris paribus, is the number of different employment careers with exactly  i E −  
qualifying points and the greater is the range of the distribution of different waiting 
times of otherwise identical job seekers.
2 There are two cases to distinguish. 
                                            







F  employment careers with  i E −  qualifying points in the base period F, 
E i , , 0 K = . If, for example, – as in Germany – the base period comprises  24 = F  months and the   14
First, if  E F = , there is exactly one employment career which meets the 
qualification requirement: Only those workers who were continuously employed for 
at least E periods are eligible to UB. Second, if  E F > , then the number of different 
employment careers with a current counter of  0 ≥ −i E  qualifying points is possibly 
very large, as is indicated by the following simple example. Let A and B be two job 
seekers with identical qualifying counters  0 ≥ −i E . Assume that both remain 
unemployed in the next period and, moreover, that A was employed F periods 
ago, while B was not. Then A loses one qualifying point and faces the counter 
() 1 + − i E  at the end of the current period, whereas B still owns  i E −  points. Even 
though both workers have accumulated an additional unemployment period at the 
end of the current period, the 'bifurcation' arises, because the unemployed A 
replaces a period of employment at the beginning of the current base period with 
the current unemployment period, so that his qualifying counter decreases by one; 
whereas B, on the other hand, replaces an unemployment period at the beginning 
of the current base period with the current unemployment period, so that his 
qualifying counter remains constant. Consequently, the expected waiting time of A 
is at least one period longer than the waiting time of B.  
 
An investor offering a vacancy knows just as little ex ante about the applicants 
specific employment careers as about their accumulated qualifying points or their 
residual benefit claims. Yet the ex post value of the job and, consequently, his 
decision to offer a vacancy depends on these variables and on his expectations 
concerning these characteristics of an applicant. In order to provide a simple 
model of the investor’s decision, we introduce assumption (A5) below, which 
assures that the initial value of a filled job,  j iT E − − Π , will indeed only depend on 
the characteristics [] j T i E − − ,  of the applicant and not on the distribution of the 
i E −  employment periods over the base period F. The risk-neutral investor then 
needs only to estimate the probability  j iT E − − μ  of meeting a type [] j T i E − − ,  
applicant. 
 
We model the effect of the applicants employment careers and the above 
mentioned bifurcation on the decision of the investors to offer vacancies using the 
following Markov process. Let  j iT E u − −  denote the pool of job seekers with  i E −  
qualifying points and  j T −  residual benefit periods. 
 
                                                                                                                                    







F 6 10 * 7 , 2 =  possible employment careers with 
a completed qualifying period.   15
(A5) [Employment Career]. The unemployed from  j iT E u − − , who have found no 
job, make either a transition into the pool  () 1 + − − j iT E u  (like the job seeker B in the 
above example) or into the pool  ()( ) 1 1 + − + − j T i E u  (like the job seeker A in the above 
example), where the first transition occurs with the probability  [ ) 1 , 0 ∈ γ  and the 
second with the probability  ( ] 1 , 0 1 ∈ −γ . 
 
At the micro level, there exists no correlate of the transition probability γ. At the 
macro level in contrast, the policy parameter γ has quite the same effect as the 
distribution of the employment periods  i E −  over the base period F. First, if  E F = , 
this case corresponds to a transition probability of  0 = γ , as there is only one 
employment career which meets the qualification requirement. In the second case 
E F > . The longer the base period F ceteris paribus the higher is the fraction of 
agents in the inflow to the aggregate pool of unemployed u, who can claim UB. An 
increase in the transition probability γ has obviously the same effect on the mix of 
types in the inflow to u as an extension of the base period F. The reason is that on 
the macro level, γ determines the fraction of the job seekers from the aggregate 
pool  ≡ −i E u   ∑ = − −
T
j j iT E u 1 ,  E i , , 0 K = , whose qualifying counters do not decrease 
despite the advancing calendar time and who therefore search for a job in the 
following period with  i E −  qualifying points again.
3 On the other hand, for the 
fraction  γ − 1  of the unemployed from pool  i E u − , both the counter of the residual 
claims and the qualifying counter decrease by one and their reservation income 
reduces correspondingly. Third – just as in the case  ∞ → F  –, if  1 → γ , the fraction 
of the employed workers with a completed qualifying period approaches unity 
irrespective of the length of the qualifying period E. 
 
3.3 Qualifying Path and the Equilibrium Rate of Unemployment 
 
The unemployment insurance [] b T E , , ,γ  with qualifying period E, base period γ 
and benefit duration T creates a discrete distribution of E  types among the pool of 
employed workers: Employed workers differ in the qualifying counter  i E − , 
1 , , 0 − = E i K . In the following,  i E e −  denotes the pool of workers with  i E −  
qualifying points. Among the u unemployed, the unemployment insurance likewise 
creates a discrete distribution of types, who differ with respect to the qualifying 
                                            
3  The effects of the parameters of the labour market policy [ ] b T E , , ,γ  on the equilibrium 
unemployment rate u do not depend on whether the qualifying period E is shorter or longer than 
the benefit duration T. For the sake of brevity, we present the model equations for the case 
T E ≤ , which most of the OECD (2004) countries follow. The simulations and results in Section 
4 of the paper, however, also take into account the case  1 + ≥T E .   16
points  i E − , where  1 , , 0 − = E i K , and the residual benefit duration  j T − , where 
T i j , ,K =  by assumption (A5) and  E T ≥ .
4  
 
Since the time of the model is discrete, every employed worker owns at least one 
qualifying point. Job seekers from the pool  ∑ = = −
T
E j j T u u 0 0 , who do not possess 
qualifying points, begin their employment career in the pool  1 e  and make a 
transition to the pool  2 e , if  2 R x ≥  at the end of the first period of the current 
employment spell.
5  2 R  is the reservation productivity for the transition from the 
pool  1 e  to pool  2 e , see Figure 1. Consider a filled job with  i E − ,  1 , , 1 − = E i K , 
qualifying points. At the end of the period the firm has to decide whether to 
continue the job or not. Given  [ ] 1 , α ∈ x , the match is continued if  () 1 − − ≥ i E R x  and 
the worker makes a transition to the pool  () 1 − − i E e . Otherwise the match dissolves, 
the job becomes vacant and the worker unemployed – without claim to UB. Match 
partners from the pool  1 − E e  close to the completion of the qualifying period decide 
to continue and make a transition to pool  E e , if  E R x ≥ . The pool  E e  comprises 
exclusively jobs with a completed qualifying period. A job from  E e  is continued, if 
1 + ≥ E R x . Otherwise, it is destroyed, and the worker becomes unemployed - with 
claim to UB.  1 + E R  is the reservation productivity of the jobs with a completed 
qualifying period. 
 
We call the path of the reservation productivities  [ ] E E R R , , 2 K = Ψ ,  2 ≥ E , the 
qualifying path: Every worker must – possibly interrupted by unemployment spells 
– pass through the qualifying path  E Ψ  before his qualifying period is completed 






Figure 1: Qualifying path 
                                            
4   If  T E ≤ , there are  () ( )( ) ( ) 2 1 1 1 1
1 + − + + = ∑ + − +
= E E T E k E T E
k  types of job seeker; if  1 + ≥T E , the 
number of job seeker types amounts to  ( ) ( ) ( ) () 1 2 1 1 0 + + + = − + ∑ − + = E T T T E k T T
k . The steady 
state equations for the employees  i E e −  and job seekers  j iT E u − −  are developed further in 
Appendix IV. 
5  Whether the creation of vacancies is profitable depends in particular on the reservation 
productivity 1 R . For profitability  1 1 ≤ R  is a necessary condition because the firms choose the 
initial productivity at  1 = x . 
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Out of the  i E e −  employed workers with the qualifying counter  i E − , 
() ( ) i E i E e R G − − − 1 λ  lose their job at the end of the period. In the ensuing matching at 
the beginning of the following period, ( ) () ( ) i E i E e R G p − − − − 1 1 λ  do not meet a vacancy 
and form the inflow to the pool of unemployed  i E u − ;  ( ) () ( ) 1 1 − − − i E R G p λ  is the ex-
post-incidence among the workers with the qualifying counter  i E − . In the steady 
state, entries to the unemployment pool u are equal to exits, so that 
() () () pu e R G p E i
i i E i E = ∑ − − =
= − − −
1
0 1 1 λ . If we divide both sides of the steady state 
condition by e and take into account that  u e − =1 , we obtain the equilibrium 
unemployment rate 
(22)   ()
() [] () ()
() [] () () () θ ε λ θ
ε λ θ
Ψ θ





i E i E
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, , , 
where  () 1 , , + − − = E E i E i E R Ψ θ ε ε , with  e e i E i E − − = ε ,  1 , , 0 − = E i K , is the fraction of 
the employed workers with the qualifying counter  i E − , hence  1 1
0 = ∑ −
= −
E
i i E ε . As 
Lemma A3 in the Appendix IV shows, the shares  i E− ε  and therefore the 
unemployment rate (22) are functions of the tightness of the labor market θ, the 
qualifying path  [ ] E E R R , , 2 K = Ψ  and the reservation productivity  1 + E R  of the jobs 
with a completed qualifying period. 
 
The equilibrium unemployment rate (22) – similarly to the steady state rate (4) of 
the unemployment insurance [] b T,  – depends on, first, the weighted average of 
the ex-post-incidences,  () [] () ( ) ∑ − −
= − − −
1
0 1 1 E
i i E i E R G p ε λ θ , and second, the duration of 
job search,  () θ p 1 .  
 
3.4 Qualifying Rents and Waiting Time 
 
First, we deal with the asset equations of the filled jobs and the employed workers 
in the continuation periods of a match, then we focus on the job creation condition, 
the wage negotiation, the qualifying rents and finally the waiting time.
6  
 
Continuation periods. The value of a filled job with a completed qualifying period is 
derived from the asset Equation (6) and the value of the worker from Equation (7). 
                                            
6  The initial value of a newly filled job, the value of an outsider, who accepts a job, and the sharing 
rule that job seekers and vacancies use in their first contract negotiation as well as the asset 
equations for the value of the unemployed are developed in Appendix III. The asset equations 
(A6) and (A7) determine the initial values of the jobs and the workers, the value of the 
unemployed human capital is represented in the equation (A8).   18
For convenience, we repeat the equations below. The market value of a filled job 
with a completed qualifying period is 
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The present value of a worker with a completed qualifying period is 
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λ λ ρ , 
where  [] ℜ → + + 1 , : 1 1 E E R w  is the function of the inside wage and  ET U  is the value 
of a job seeker whose qualifying period and benefit entitlement are complete (see 
Equation (A8), Appendix III). Firm and worker with a completed qualifying period 
share the match rent according to the rule (14). 
 
The continuation value of a job with  i E −  qualifying points,  1 , , 0 − = E i K , and the 
productivity  [] 1 , i E R x − ∈  is given by 
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, 0 max 1
i E R
i E i E i E i E x h dG h x w yx x Π λ Π λ ρ Π . 
The firm chooses the reservation productivity  () 1 − − i E R , on which the transition to 
the pool  () 1 − − i E e  depends. If the match is hit by a shock and draws the productivity 
() 1 − − ≥ i E R h , the match is continued, otherwise it is destroyed. If no shock arrives, 
firm and worker must still decide whether to proceed. The reason is that if the 
match continues, the worker makes a transition to the pool  () 1 − − i E e , so the value of 
the filled job in the continuation period is  () ( ) x i E 1 − − Π . Since the profit maximizing 
firm is free to destroy the job at no charge, it decides for the alternative 
() () { } x i E 1 , 0 max − − Π . The worker also prefers continuation only if  () () 0 1 ≥ − − x i E Π , as 
is shown below. 
 
The value of a worker with the qualifying counter  i E − ,  1 , , 0 − = E i K  is given by   19
(26) ()
() () () ( )
() ( ) {}
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If the job is hit by a shock and draws  () 1 − − < i E R h , it is destroyed and the worker 
with the qualifying counter  i E −  becomes unemployed. In the case  0 = i , the 
unemployed who is entitled to UB has the value  ET U ; in the case  1 , , 1 − = E i K , 
the worker’s qualifying period is not yet completed and his value is  0 i E U − . If no 
shock occurs, the worker chooses the alternative  () () { } x W U i E i E 1 0, max − − − . If 
() () 0 1 i E i E U x W − − − ≥  – or  () ET E U x W ≥ +1 , in the case  0 = i  – he decides to continue 
the match, otherwise he leaves the firm and makes a transition to the pool of 
unemployed. As the insiders share the rent of the job according to the rule 





0 1 ,  1 , , 0 − = E i K , 
() () 0 1 i E i E U x W − − − ≥  applies if and only if  () ( ) 0 1 ≥ − − x i E Π . The sharing rule (27) takes 
into account that the worker  ] 0 , [ i E −  makes a transition to  () 1 − − i E e  if the wage 
negotiations succeed. If the bargaining fails, the worker becomes unemployed with 
a qualifying counter equal to  i E −  without entitlement to benefits. In this case his 
value is  0 i E U − . 
 
Job creation. Out of the u job seekers, there are  j iT E u − −  with  i E −  qualifying 
points and a current spell of unemployment of length j. Since all job seekers look 
for jobs with the same search intensity, for a given vacancy  u u j iT E j iT E − − − − = μ  is 
the conditional probability of an application from a job seeker from  j iT E u − − . The 
probabilities  j iT E − − μ  – developed in Lemma A4, Appendix IV – are functions of the 
tightness  θ, the base period γ, the qualifying path  [ ] E E R R , , 2 K = Ψ  and the 
reservation productivity  1 + E R  for jobs with a completed qualification. The expected 
market value of a newly filled job is ∑ − − − − j iT E j iT E Π μ . Access to the labor market 
is free, so that the following job creation condition applies in the steady state, 
given the search costs k and the probability q of an application:   20
(28)  ∑∑ + − =
==





j iT E j iT E q k
0
0 Π μ . 
The agents negotiate the following inside and outside wages. 
 
Lemma 4 [Bargained Wages]. (i) The bargained inside wage of a worker with a 
completed qualifying period at a match specific productivity  [ ] 1 , α ∈ x  is 
(29)      () ( ) ET ET E rU yx rU x w − + = + β 1 . 
The inside wage of a worker with the counter  i E −  and the job specific productivity 
[] 1 , α ∈ x  is: 
(30) 
[] ( )[ ]
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(ii) Since newly filled jobs produce with the productivity  1 x = , a job seeker with the 
counter  i E −  and a residual benefit duration of  j T −  periods,  T i j , ,K = , obtains the 
outside wage 
(31) 
() ( ) ()
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where  () 1 1 + E w  and  () () 1 1 − − i E w  are the inside-wages (29) and (30) for  1 = x . 
 
The inside wage  ) (x w i E−  of a worker with the counter  i E −  has – as (30) shows – 
three components: the reservation income,  () 0 1 + − i E rU , the worker’s share of the 
current match rent,  () ] [ 0 1 + − − i E rU yx β , and the side payment 
() () ] [ 1 0 1 0 + − − − − i E i E U U β . To understand the reason for the side payment notice 
that at the end of the current period, the worker has  ( ) 1 + − i E  qualifying points and 
the reservation value  () 0 1 + − i E U . If the match is continued, the counter increases by 
one to  i E −  and the reservation value of the human capital increases by the 
qualifying rent  () 0 1 0 + − − − i E i E U U . The firm, which employs the worker, appropriates 
the share  β − 1  of the qualifying rent. The qualifying rent is the result of 
institutional frictions, which emerge from the prevailing order of the labor law. In 
accordance with assumption (A2), the qualifying period is an asset owned by the 
worker, which is not tradable. Thus, since the labor force is exogenous, a 
dissipation of the qualifying rent is generally excluded, even in the steady state.  
 
If one compares, ceteris paribus, two agents with a completed qualifying period 
( 0 = i ) – one is an outsider, the other an insider – then, as we would expect, the 
outsider is worse off, because, as opposed to the insider, he has to pay a side 
payment, as seen in the first line of (31). The size of the payment is determined by 
the length j of the current spell of unemployment and the quasi-rent  j ET ET U U − − ,   21
by which the reservation value of the outsider is lower than the reservation value 
of the insider. 
 
Now compare two agents with the counter  i E −  who have not yet completed their 
qualifying period – where one is an outsider with a residual entitlement of  j T −  
periods, the other is an insider – then the outsider is better off, since he receives a 
wage bonus, which is dependent on the quasi-rent  0 i E j iT E U U − − − − , as the second 
line of (31) shows. The insider is worse off, because his qualifying period is not yet 
completed and, as a result, in accordance with assumptions (A1) and (A2), he has 
no benefit entitlement – as opposed to the outsider. 
 
As the following proposition shows, the market value of a filled job  () () x i E 1 − − Π , 
E i , , 0 K = , is a continuously increasing function of  [ ] 1 , α ∈ x . If  () () 0 1 ≤ − − α Π i E , as 
we assume throughout, a reservation productivity  () 1 − − i E R  exists, which fulfils the 
reservation condition 
 
(32)  () () ( ) 0 1 1 = − − − − i E i E R Π ,  E i , , 0 K = . 
The asset values of the filled jobs and the job destruction rules are discussed in 
the following proposition, which is proved in the Appendix III. 
 
Proposition (i) [Filled Jobs]. The value of a filled job with a completed qualifying period 
and the idiosyncratic productivity  [ ] 1 , 1 + ∈ E R x , is 









1 1 . 
Through backward induction, the continuity and monotonicity of  () x E 1 + Π  are transferred 
to  () x i E− Π , as the Equation (34) shows. The value of a job from the pool  i E e − , 
1 , , 0 − = E i K , is 
(34)  () ( )( ) ( ) () ( ) { } () () { } [ ] {} . , 0 max , 0 max 1 1 1 1 i E i E i E i E i E R x R x y x − − − − − − − − − + − − = Π Π λ β ρ Π  
 
(ii) [Job Destruction]. For a job with a completed qualifying period, the job destruction 
rule can be derived by evaluating the asset Equation (23) at the reservation threshold 
1 + = E R x . Taking into account the wage Equation (29) we obtain: 

















For a job with the qualifying counter  i E − , the job destruction rule can be derived from 
the asset Equation (25), the reservation condition (32) and the wage Equation (30) with   22
(36)
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As the Equations (35) and (36) show, the current reservation output of a match is 
lower than the match’s permanent reservation income both during the waiting time 
of the worker, see Equations (36), and also after the completion of the qualifying 
period, see Equation (35). The reservation income of a match – given the 
assumption of free disposal and the infinitely elastic supply of vacancies – is 
identical with the reservation income of the worker. 
 
With the job termination rule (35), the firm chooses the reservation productivity 
1 + E R  such that  ET E rU yR < +1  for the reservation output of the match. The firms are 
willing to hoard labor, even if hit by severe demand shocks. The reasons for this 
behavior are the search costs and the resulting option value of a filled job. The 
option value is the expected market value of a productive job weighted with the 
shock probability λ. If demand changes in favor of the job, the hoarded workers 
are immediately ready to start production, since neither search nor recruiting costs 
arise on the ‘internal labor market’. If the match partners would separate as soon 
as the output falls below the reservation income of the match, they would sacrifice 
this option and have to search for another match. 
 
The waiting time is the time that passes until a worker on the qualifying path 
becomes eligible to UB. Under the conditions of the unemployment insurance 
[] b T E , , ,γ , the waiting time is endogenous, whereby workers face the following 
trade-off. 
 
The shock parameter  [] 1 , α ∈ x  is bounded from below. Consequently, a match can 
force the continuation of production until the UI entitlement is reached. Thus, for 
example, a worker with the qualifying counter  i E −  can reduce his waiting time to 
exactly i periods, if the firm fixes the reservation productivity along the residual 
qualifying path at the level of the lower support α. By taking this decision, however,   23
the worker must accept a low, possibly negative wage, what pays only if he can 
expect a high UB b, a long benefit duration T or a low utility of leisure z. 
 
The worker will weigh the disadvantages of restraining his wage claims against the 
benefit from a reduction in the waiting time. His willingness to restrain his wage 
claims during the waiting time – as the job destruction rule (36) shows – is 
bounded by the path of the reservation incomes, the qualifying rents he can expect 
to capture and the option value of the filled job. 
 
The option value of the filled job is measured by the integral expression in 
Equation (36). Since the worker makes a transition independent of the prevailing 
market conditions from  i E e −  to  () 1 − − i E e  when the job is continued, the lower bound 
of the integral is the reservation productivity  () 1 − − i E R  that is the threshold 
productivity for the transition to  () 1 − − i E e . 
 
If the firm currently produces at the break-even point with the reservation 
productivity  i E R −  and is not hit by a shock – an event which has the probability 
λ − 1  – the firm opts for the alternative  () ( ) { } i E i E R − − − 1 , 0 max Π  as a consequence of 
the free disposal. 
 
Finally, the worker’s willingness to accept a sequence of low wages on the 
qualifying path is bounded by the qualifying rents. If the firm chooses the 
reservation productivity  i E R − , it takes the worker’s reservation value  () 0 1 + − i E U  into 
account. If the match is continued, the reservation value of the worker increases to 
0 i E U − . In order to capture the qualifying rent  () 0 1 0 + − − − i E i E U U  created by the 
insurance system, the worker is willing to accept a reduction of the reservation 




To solve the model, we must determine the equilibrium path of the reservation 
productivities  () 1 − − i E R ,  E i , , 0 K = , and the steady state tightness θ of the labor 
market – in total  2 + E  variables. The reservation productivities depend on the 
reservation wages of the workers, the qualifying rents and the market values of the 
filled jobs, as the job destruction rules (35) and (36) show. The market values of 
the filled jobs are in turn functions of the reservation productivities, as Equations 
(33) and (34) show. In order to close the model, Lemma A6 in Appendix IV makes 
clear how both the reservation wages of the workers and the qualifying rents 
depend on the market values of the filled jobs and, thus, the reservation   24
productivities. To calculate the tightness θ, we need the job creation condition (28). 
The conditional probabilities  j iT E − − μ  of meeting a job seeker with the qualifying 
counter  i E −  and a residual benefit duration of  j T −  periods are developed in 
Lemma A4 in Appendix IV.  
4. SIMULATION 
Parameters and matching function. The base line parameters for the numeric 
simulations are shown in Table 2. The bargaining power of the workers is 
50 . 0 = β , the output of a job at full productivity is  100 = y . The value of leisure is 
30 = z , UB are  30 = b . The real interest rate r is 2  %; the probability of a 
productivity shock λ is 10 %; the search and recruiting costs of a vacancy amount 
to  30 = k . The distribution function  ( ) x G  of the productivity shocks is assumed to 
be uniform on [] 1 , α , with the lower support  0 = α . If we replace the uniform 
distribution by a beta distribution with varying parameter values we receive for all 
simulations similar results. The matching function of the search market is of the 
Cobb-Douglas type (Petrongolo/Pissarides 2001). For a given vacancy, the 
probability of a contact with a job seeker is  ( )= θ q ( ) φ δθ − − 1 . For the elasticity of the 
job matches with respect to the supply of vacancies, we use  50 . 0 = φ  and for the 
‘total factor productivity’ we assume  60 . 0 = δ .  
Table 2: The baseline parameter of the model 
β  r  λ  y  z b k α  φ  δ 
0.50 0.02 0.10 100 30 30 30  0  0.50 0.60 
 
The results of the simulations with the qualifying period E, the benefit duration T 
and the base period γ are shown in Appendix I. Figures 2-4 provide simulations 
with the benefit duration T and the qualifying period E for a given base period 
10 . 0 = γ . For the qualifying period, we assume  8 , 4 = E  and for the benefit duration 
20 , , 2 , 1 K = T . In addition, Appendix I compares the two unemployment insurance 
systems  [] b T E , , ,γ  and [] b T,  (see Section 2). With the unemployment insurance 
[] b T, , every employed worker is entitled to up to T payments of the UB b. The 
model of the unemployment insurance [ ] b T, , therefore, implicitly assumes that for 
the qualifying period  1 = E  and the base period  1 = γ . Figures 5a-c deal with 
comparative static simulations with the base period γ for a benefit duration of 
10 = T  periods and the qualifying periods  8 , 4 = E . 
 
Result 1 [Decreasing Qualifying Path  [ ] E E R R , , 2 K = Ψ ]. Figure 2a, Appendix I, 
shows the qualifying paths  E Ψ  for  4 = E  and  8 = E , a benefit duration of  10 = T    25
periods and a base period  10 . 0 = γ . The counter of the qualifying period, 
1 , , 1 + = E i K , is depicted on the horizontal axis and the corresponding reservation 
productivities are graphed on the vertical axis. For example, figure 2b pictures, for 
the case  4 = E , the four reservation productivities of the qualifying path  4 Ψ  and the 
reservation productivity  1 + E R  of the jobs with a completed qualifying period, against 
the benefit duration T on the horizontal axis. 
 
As Figure 2a and 2b demonstrate, the qualifying path  E Ψ  follows the same pattern 
in all simulations: First, the qualifying paths are concave and to reap the qualifying 
rents firms reduce the reservation productivities  () 1 − − i E R ,  E i , , 0 K = , until they 
reach a minimum in the last period before the completion of the qualifying period. 
Second, as soon as firm and worker have captured all rents and the worker is 
entitled to the UB, the reservation productivity, the quit rate and the wage of the 
employed worker jump to the levels of the jobs with a completed qualifying period, 
such that  α ≥ > > > > + E E R R R R K 2 1 1 . If we draw a vertical line through Figure 2b 
at  10 = T , we obtain the qualifying path  4 Ψ  for  4 = E , which is shown in Figure 2a.  
 
Result 2 [Benefit Duration T]. The benefit duration T affects u via two channels: 
First, through the weighted ex-post-incidence,  In-exP  
() () () ∑ − ≡ − =
= − − −
1
0 1 1 E i
i i E i E R G p ε λ , and second, through the expected unemployment 
duration  p D 1 = .  In-exP, the weighted ex-post-incidence, is the fraction of the 
employed workers who lose their job, do not find a follow-up job at the subsequent 
matching and, as a result, are unemployed for at least one period.  
 
Consider, for example, the insurance system with the qualifying period  4 = E . If 
the policymakers increase the benefit duration from  1 = T  to  20 = T , the expected 
duration of unemployment increases from  84 . 1 = D  periods to  17 . 2 = D  periods, 
see Figure 3a, while the ex-post-incidence grows from 4.1 % to 4.8 %, see Figure 
3b. For a given qualifying period E therefore, the unemployment rate u strictly 
increases with the benefit duration T, see Figure 3c. For  4 = E , for example, the 
equilibrium rate of unemployment increases from 7  % to 9.5  %, if the benefit 
duration rises from  1 = T  to  20 = T . 
 
Result 3 [Qualifying Period E]. An extension of the qualifying period E for a given 
base period ( 10 . 0 = γ ) lowers the unemployment rate, as Figure 3c and Figure 4 
make clear. 
 
The unemployment rate strictly decreases with an increasing E, since, ceteris 
paribus, both the unemployment duration and the weighted ex-post-incidence   26
decrease with the rising E, see Figure 3a and Figure 3b. For example, with 
10 . 0 = γ  and  10 = T  the unemployment rate falls from  74 . 9 = u  % to  13 . 9 = u  %, if 
the qualifying period E increases from 1 to 10 calendar periods. 
 
Result 4 [Comparison Between the Insurance Systems]. The insurance system 
[] b T,  implicitly sets  1 = E  and  1 = γ , such that u is strictly higher than in the 
insurance systems with qualifying periods  2 ≥ E , see the dotted lines in the 
Figures 3a-c. The reasons for the increasing difference between the equilibrium 
rates of unemployment of the two insurance systems are, that under the conditions 
of the insurance [ ] b T E , , ,γ  not only is the average duration of unemployment 
shorter than in the system [] b T,  but the ex-post-incidence is also lower. What are 
the reasons for this ordering? 
 
The risk-neutral match partners have rational expectations and anticipate the 
consequences of job destruction. In the insurance system [] b T E , , ,γ , the 
destruction of a job that qualifies for UB occurs with the endogenous probability 
() 1 + E R G λ , whereas in the system [ ] b T,  the probability is  () R G λ , where 
() ( ) 1 + > E R G R G λ λ . In fact, the workers in both insurance systems are entitled to 
the UB b and an equally long benefit duration of T periods. Furthermore, in both 
insurance systems, they have a positive probability of losing their benefit 
entitlement and to become long term unemployed. Yet with the unemployment 
insurance  [] b T, , they can be sure of having the benefit entitlement regained with 
their next job. Moreover, the waiting time, which elapses until a worker who loses 
his current job receives the next benefit entitlement, is under [] b T,  identical with 
the duration of job search, which is equal to  p / 1 . In the insurance system 
[] b T E , , ,γ , on the other hand, a positive probability exists that the worker with an 
increasing duration of unemployment will not only lose his benefit entitlement, but 
also his qualifying points, so that, on average, ceteris paribus more time will pass 
until the completion of the next qualifying period than just the time of the job 
search, which is the lower bound for the waiting time. 
 
While the waiting time which elapses between two benefit entitlements in the 
system [] b T,  is exogenous for the individual match and identical with the expected 
duration of job search,  p / 1 , from the perspective of the job seeker, the waiting 
time in the insurance system [] b T E , , ,γ  is endogenous and bounded from below by 
the expected duration of an unemployment spell. As a consequence, the 
reservation wage of a worker entitled to UB is, ceteris paribus, lower in the 
insurance system [] b T E , , ,γ  than in the unemployment insurance [] b T, , his wage   27
income is also lower and his willingness to continue the match despite adverse 
demand shocks is higher. 
 
Result 5 [Base Period and Convergence]. Figure 5a-c illustrate the impact of the 
base period γ on the (weighted) ex-post-incidence, see Figure 5a, the 
unemployment duration, see Figure 5b, and the equilibrium unemployment rate, 
see Figure 5c. Just for comparison, the figures show the corresponding graphs for 
the unemployment insurance [] b T, . 
 
As Figure 5c shows, the equilibrium rate of unemployment strictly increases with 
the base period γ. An increase in γ does not only lower the waiting time, but also 
the qualifying rents and therefore the option value of a filled job. Moreover, the 
expected wage income increases, the supply of vacancies falls and, as a result, 
both the duration of unemployment, see Figure 5b, and the weighted ex-post-
incidence, see Figure 5a, increase. In addition, Figure 5a–c illustrate that the equi-
librium values of the ex-post incidence, the unemployment duration and hence the 
unemployment rate in the class of insurance systems [ ] b T E , , ,γ  with  2 ≥ E , con-
verge with rising γ from below to the corresponding values of the insurance [] b T, . 
 
Result 6 [Iso-Unemployment Curve  5 . 9 = u  %]. The insurance system [] b T E , , ,γ  
consists of four policy parameters. The ‘iso-unemployment curves’ in the policy 
space are therefore four-dimensional hyperplanes. Figures 6a-c depict three-
dimensional  ) , , ( T E γ -sectors of the iso-unemployment curve for  5 . 9 = u  %. Figure 
6b illustrates the  ) , , ( T E γ -plane for an UB of  30 = b , while Figures 6a and 6c show 
the corresponding  ) , , ( T E γ -planes for a 5 % reduction of the UB to  5 . 28 = b  and a 
5 % increase of the UB to  5 . 31 = b  respectively. 
 
Figures 7a-c and 8a-c graph two-dimensional sectors of the iso-unemployment 
curve  5 . 9 = u  %. Figure 7a shows the negative trade-off between the UB b and the 
benefit duration T for the base periods  10 . 0 = γ  and  60 . 0 = γ , where  4 = E ; for 
10 = T  Figure 7b depicts the positive trade-off between the UB b and the qualifying 
period E, where for the base periods  10 . 0 = γ ,  30 . 0 = γ  and  60 . 0 = γ ; Figure 7c 
shows the positive trade-off between the benefit duration T and the qualifying 
period E for the base periods  10 . 0 = γ  and  30 . 0 = γ . Figures 8a-c depict the base 
period γ on the vertical axis and the UB b, the benefit duration T and the qualifying 
period E on the horizontal axes. Figure 8a shows the negative trade-off between 
the UB b and the length of the base period γ; Figure 8b graphs the negative trade-
off between the benefit duration T and the base period γ; and Figure 8c finally 
shows the positive trade-off between the base period γ and the qualifying period E.   28
5. CONCLUSION 
Base period and qualifying period are instruments of the labor market policy, which 
have so far received little attention in labor market theory, macroeconomic theory 
and empirical research. We develop a Mortensen-Pissarides type search model, in 
which we integrate the following policy instruments: The base period, the 
qualifying period, the unemployment benefit and a finite benefit duration. A worker 
is entitled to UB, if he has completed the statutory qualifying period within the base 
period. 
 
The qualifying period lowers both the incidence and the duration of unemployment 
and therefore reduces the aggregate unemployment rate. On the other hand, an 
increasing base period weakens the effect of the qualifying period by providing 
workers with a time margin to meet the criterion of the qualifying rule. The longer 
the base period, the higher therefore the equilibrium rate of unemployment. 
 
In an unemployment insurance system without qualifying rule – as for example in 
the standard MP-model – the time that passes until the benefit entitlement occurs 
is exogenous. Every worker, who makes a transition to unemployment, is entitled 
to UB and every job seeker must wait until he finds a new job and in turn the next 
benefit entitlement. The qualifying period endogenizes the waiting time and 
confronts the workers with the following trade-off. The lower the separation rates 
negotiated by the match, the longer the durability of the job, the shorter the waiting 
time, but also the lower the worker’s wage. The decision to reduce the waiting time 
is more attractive the higher the UB are, the longer the benefit duration and the 
lower the utility of leisure. The price for a prolongation of the durability of the job 
and a shorter waiting time is the wage penalty, which the worker must accept, if 
the match is hit by adverse productivity or demand shocks. 
 
For a match on the qualifying path, the separation rate falls from period to period, 
until it reaches a minimum in the last time period before the completion of the 
qualifying criterion. At this point, the qualifying rents created by the unemployment 
insurance are skimmed off, and the reservation productivity and with it the 
separation rate and the wage of the workers, who are now entitled to UB, increase 
sharply.    29
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APPENDIX II 
Proof of Lemma 1. (i): From (14), it follows that ( ) ( ) ( )( ) x x W UT Π β β β − − = − 1 1 . Solve 
the asset Equations (6) and (7) with respect to  ) x ( Π  and  ) x ( W , insert the solutions into 
the above equation and rearrange terms to get the inside wage (16). 
(ii) From (15), it follows that () ( ) j T j T j T W U − − − − − = − Π β β β 1 1 . Inserting (8) and (9) into 
the last equation gives () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )] 1 [ ] 1 1 1 [ 1 w w W U j T j T − + − − = − − − ρ Π β β β , from which in 
view of (14) the outside wage (17) follows. 
 
Proof of Lemma 2. (i) and (ii): From (5) and (6) we have  ( )( ) ( ) ∫ + − =
1 0 R h dG h R w yR Π λ . 
From this equation, taking (16) and (6) into account we obtain the Equations (18) and 
(19).  
 
Proof of Lemma 3. (i) From (13), (15), (8) and the wage Equation (17), it follows that  
( A 1 )        () ] [ 1 + − − + + + = j T j T U b z d D U . 





















. Solving the difference 
Equation (A1) gives: 
(A2)      = − j T U () [] 0 1
1










In the same way, it follows from (12), (15), (8) and (17) for  0 U :  


























Using (A3) in (A2) gives: 
(A4)  ()


























From (A4) we obtain the asset Equation (20). 
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APPENDIX III 
The sharing rule for wage negotiations between a vacancy and a job seeker is given by 





,  E , , i K 0 = ,  T , , i j K = , 
where  j iT E W − −  is the value of a entrant with  i E −  qualifying points and a residual benefit 
duration of  j T −  periods,  j iT E U − −  is the value of the unemployed outsider, and  j iT E − − Π  
is the initial value of a job occupied by an entrant with the characteristics  ] , [ j T i E − − . 
j iT E − − Π  depends on the job seeker’s residual claims and the current status of the 
qualifying counter, where in view of the initial productivity  1 = x , the outside wage  j iT E w − −  
and the asset Equations (23) and (25): 
(A6) 
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For the distribution of the initial values of the job seekers,  j iT E W − − , analogously we have: 
(A7) 
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Finally, the distribution of the steady state values of the job seekers is given by: 
(A8)   
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() () () []
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In (A8) z is the utility of leisure, b the UB and  [ ) 1 , 0 ∈ γ  the length of the base period. If 
the job seeker does not meet a vacancy, his current spell of unemployment increases 
from length j to  1 + j , while the counter of the qualifying period is constant with probability 
1 < γ  and decreases from  i E −  to  ( ) 1 + − i E  by one point with probability  0 1 > −γ .
7 
   
                                            
7  The job seeker – like B in the introductory example – was unemployed F periods ago and in the 
second case – like A in the introductory example - he was employed F periods ago.   33
Proof of Lemma 4. (i) From the sharing rule (14), it follows that: ( ) ( )− − + x WE 1 1 β () = + x E 1 Π β  
() ET U β − 1 . Using the asset Equations (23) – (24) and rearranging terms provides the 
wage Equation (29). For convenience, we repeat the equation below: 
(A9)   () ( ) ET ET E rU yx rU x w − + = + β 1 . 
From the sharing rule (27), it follows that: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) () 0 1 1 1 + − − − − = − − i E i E i E U x x W β Π β β , 
1 , , 0 − = E i K . If we use the asset Equation (25) and assume  0 = i , then by virtue of the 
first line of (26) and (A9), we obtain the first line of the wage Equation (A10) below. The 
other wage equations of (A10) for  1 , , 1 − = E i K  result analogously: 
(A10) ()
() ( ) ( )
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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The wage Equation (30) is developed in the following way. For  0 = i , we get from (A10): 




+ − − − E ET E U U x w ρ β . If we replace  ( ) x wE 1 +  using (A9), we get in view of 
r + =
− 1
1 ρ  the first line of (30):  ( ) ( )= − − − − + = −
−
10
1 1 E ET ET ET E U U ) rU yx ( rU ) x ( w ρ β β  
− + − yx rU ) ( ET β β 1 () ( ) = − − −
−
10
1 1 E ET U U ρ β − − + − − ) rU yx ( rU E E 10 10 β ( ) − − ET U ( β 1
) UE 10 − . Now we assume that the wage Equation (30) holds for  () ( ) x w i E 1 − − . Then for 
() x w i E− , we obtain with (A10):  () () ( ) ( ) () ( ) + − − − =
−
+ − − − − −
1
0 1 0 1 1 ρ β i E i E i E i E U U x w x w  
()() ( ) 0 0 1 1 i E i E U U − − − − − β . If we replace  () ( ) x w i E 1 − −  using (30) and rearrange, we obtain the 
wage equation for  i E − . 
 
(ii) Rewrite the sharing rule (A5): () ( ) j iT E j iT E j iT E U W − − − − − − − = − − β Π β β 1 1 , and insert the 
asset Equations (A6) and (A7) to obtain the wage Equations (31). 
 
Proof of the Proposition. (i) If we solve the asset Equation (23) for  ( ) x E 1 + Π  and take the 
wage Equation (29) into account, we obtain:  




1 1 1 1 1
1
E R E ET E h dG h rU yx
r
x Π λ β β
λ
Π . 
Let  1 + = E R x  in (A11) then by virtue of  ( ) 0 1 1 = + + E E R Π , we obtain the asset Equation (33). 
If we use the wage Equation (30) in (25), we obtain, for  1 , , 2 − = E i K :  




+ − − + − − − = + − − + − − ] [ 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 i E i E i E i E U U rU yx x β β β ρ Π  




− + ∫ − − − − − −
1
1 1 1 , 0 max 1
i E R i E i E x h dG h Π λ Π λ . 
If we use  i E R x − =  in (A12) and consider the reservation condition (32), we obtain the 
continuation value (34). 
 
(ii) If we use  1 + = E R x  in (A11) and solve the equation for  1 + E R , considering the 
reservation condition (32), we get the job-destruction rule (35). Correspondingly, if we use   34
i E R x − =  in (A12) and solve for the reservation productivity  i E R − , we get the job-
destruction-rule (36).  
APPENDIX IV 
A. Pool equations 
First we deal with the steady equations for the number of employed workers,  i E e − , 
, , 0 K = i   1 − E , then we develop the steady state conditions for the job seekers,  j iT E u − − , 
E i , , 0 K = ,  T i j , ,K = . The effects of the parameters of the labour market policy [] b T E , , ,γ  
on the equilibrium unemployment rate u do not depend on whether the qualifying period E 
is shorter or longer than the benefit duration T. For the sake of brevity, we represent the 
pool equations and the proofs for the case  T E ≤ . The simulations and results, Section 4, 
also take into account the case  1 + ≥T E . 
 
1. Employed Workers 
In the steady state, the following equations hold for the number of the employed workers 
with the qualifying counter  i E −  and  1 , , 0 − = E i K : 
(A13)  
() [] () ( ) []
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Ad  0 = i :  E e  is the measure of the employed workers with a completed qualifying 
period. The inflow of  E e  consists first of workers with a productive job who are entitled to 
UB,  () [] E E e R G 1 1 + −λ ; second, workers entitled to UB who made a job-to-job transition 
belong to the inflow,  () E E e R G p 1 + λ ; third, in the inflow are the workers of the pool  1 − E e  who 
make a transition to  E e ,  ( ) [] 1 1 − − E E e R G λ , or who made a job-to-job transition to  E e , 





m E u p , where 
∑
=
− − − ≡
T
m j
j mT E m E u u , with a qualifying counter equal to E or  1 − E  belong also to the inflow 
of  E e . 
Ad  1 − = E i : The inflow of the pool  1 e  consists of successful job seekers whose 







j E T u u
0
0 0 . 
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2. Job Seekers 
2.1 For the measure of job seekers with a completed qualifying period and a current spell 
of unemployment of length j,  j ET u − , the following holds in the steady state 
(A14)      
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()()
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Ad  0 = j :  ET u  is the pool of the unemployed with a completed qualifying period and full 
entitlement to UB. The inflow to  ET u  consists of workers with a completed qualifying 
period who lost their job in the previous period and did not meet a vacancy during the last 
matching. 
Ad  T j = : The third line of (A14) shows the inflow to the pool of job seekers with a 
completed qualifying period, but no residual claims to unemployment insurance,  0 E u . The 
inflow consists of job seekers from the pool  1 0 E E u u +  who, although without a match, 
retain their qualifying points, an event, which has the probability  ( ) p − 1 γ . 
 
2.2 For the pool of job seekers with a current spell of unemployment of length j and a 
qualifying counter equal to  i E − ,  j iT E u − − , the following steady state condition holds 
(A15) 
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Ad  i j E i = − = , 1 , , 1K : Since i j ≥ ,  i iT E u − −  is the pool of job seekers which has the 
shortest current spell of unemployment of  i j =  periods given the qualifying counter  i E − . 
As the first line of (A15) illustrates, the inflow to  i iT E u − −  consists of unsuccessful job 
seekers who still belonged to the pool  ()( ) 1 1 − − − − j T i E u  in the previous period.
8 
Ad  T j E i = − = , 1 , , 1 K : The inflow to the pool  0 i E u −  is first composed of workers who 
lost their job because of an adverse shock and did not meet a vacancy during the 
subsequent matching, () () i E i E e R G p − − − − ) ( 1 1 λ . Secondly, the fraction of the unsuccessful 
job seekers from pool  1 0 i E i E u u − − +  makes a transition to  0 i E u −  who retain their qualifying 
points.
9 Finally the fraction of unsuccessful job seekers from the pool  () () 1 1 0 1 − − − − + i E i E u u  
who lose a qualifying point belong also to the inflow to  0 i E u − . 
 
2.3 For job seekers with a current spell of unemployment of length  E j ≥ , whose 
qualifying counter is equal to zero,  j T u − 0 , the following steady state conditions hold 
                                            
8  In view of base period F, this transition corresponds to the transition of a job seeker with the 
qualifying counter  ( ) 1 − − i E  who did not meet a vacancy and was employed F periods ago. 
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Ad  T j = : The pool  00 u  consists of job seekers who have neither qualifying points nor 
residual claims for unemployment insurance. The inflow to  00 u  is composed of 
unsuccessful job seekers first from pool  01 00 u u +  and second from pool  11 10 u u +  who lose 
the last qualifying point at the transition. 
 
B. Conditional Probabilities  u u j iT E j iT E − − − − = μ  (Lemmas A1 – A5) 
Next we present the Lemmas A1 – A4, to be used to develop the functional forms of the 
above pool equations and the fractions  ( ) 1 , , + − E E i E R Ψ θ ε . Lemma A4 derives the 
conditional probabilities  j iT E − − μ  to meet a job seeker with characteristics  ] , [ j T i E − −  
from the solutions of the pool equations. 
 
1. Lemmas A1 – A4 
Lemma A1 presents solutions of the difference Equations (A14) – (A16) for the different 
types of job seekers. To solve the equations, we use the conditional probability 
() ≡ θ a () ( ) []








, which depends on the tightness θ. A job seeker with 
qualifying counter  i E −  makes a transition from his type-specific pool  ∑ = − − − ≡ T
i j j iT E i E u u  
either because his search was successful or because he did not meet a vacancy and 
loses a qualifying point. The first event occurs with the probability p, the second with the 
probability () () p − − 1 1 γ . a is the probability that a job seeker who makes a transition will 
not find a job and loses a qualifying point.  a − 1  is the probability that a job seeker who 
makes a transition will find a new job. 
 
Lemma A1 (i) [Job Seekers]. 1. For the job seeker pool  j iT E u − − , with  1 , , 0 − = E i K  and 
1 , , − = T i j K , the following is true: 
(A17)     () () () E E
i j j i
j iT E e R G p i
j u 1
1 1 1 +
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⎛ = λ γ γ . 
2. For the job seeker pool  0 i E u − , with  1 , , 1 − = E i K , we have:  
(A18)
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3. For the pool  0 E u  we can prove: 
(A19)     () () () E E
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4. For the pool  () j E T u + − 0 , with  ( ) 1 , , 0 + − = E T j K , the following is the case: 
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5. For the pool  00 u  the following is true: 
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(ii) [Aggregate Pools]. 1. In the steady state, the aggregate pool  ∑
=
− − − ≡
T
i j
j iT E i E u u , 
1 , , 1 − = E i K , is determined by 
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 the following is true 
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0 0 the following steady state equation holds: 
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Lemma A2 provides solutions of the difference Equations (A13) for the different types of 
employed workers. We use the following notation for the qualifying path: 
() E E R R , , 2 K = Ψ . 
 
Lemma A2 [Employed workers]. (i) For the pool of employed workers with the qualifying 
counter  i E − ,  1 , , 1 − = E i K , the following holds: 
(A25)    
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(ii) By using the difference Equations (A25) we obtain:  
(A26)      () E E E i E i E i E e R R R f e 1 , , , , + − − − = K θ ,  1 , 1 − = E i K  
where for the frequencies  i E f − ,  2 , , 1 − = E i K , the following holds:   38
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and for  1 f : 
(A28)  ()
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+ , 
with  1 ≡ E f . 
With Lemma A2 we obtain the fractions  ( ) 1 , , + − E E i E R Ψ θ ε , see Lemma A3, and the 
conditional probabilities  u u j iT E j iT E − − − − = μ , see Lemma A4. 
 
Lemma A3 [Fractions  i E− ε ]. The fraction of employed workers with the qualifying counter 
i E −  is 
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Ψ θ ε ,  1 , , 0 − = E i K . 
Lemma A4. For the conditional probabilities  u u j iT E j iT E − − − − = μ , we obtain, with  
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1
0
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the following: 
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where  ( ) 1 , , + − − − = E k E k E k E R f f Ψ θ .   39
2. Proofs of the Lemmas A1 – A4 
Proof of Lemma A1. (i) [JOB SEEKERS] 1. When  i j = , in view of (A15) the statement 
follows directly from the equation  ( )( ) ()() 1 1 1 1 − − − − − − − − = i T i E i iT E u p u γ  and (A14). Now, let 
i j > , then by virtue of (A15), we get the following results by induction over j: 
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2. With (A15), 
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We eliminate  1 i E u −  and  () 1 1 − − i E u  using (A17), and replace  () 0 1 − − i E u  by induction over i 













γ , to arrive at: 
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Collecting terms it follows: 
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3. With (A14)  ( )( ) 1 0 0 1 E E E u u p u + − =γ  results. If we eliminate  1 E u  with (A17) and solve for 
0 E u , the statement follows. 
 
4. From (A16)  () () () ( ) () ] 1 [ 1 1 1 1 0 0 − + − − + − + − − + − = j E T j E T j E T u u p u γ . If we eliminate  () 1 1 − + − j E T u  
with (A17) and  () 1 0 − + − j E T u  by induction over j, the statement follows: 
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= γ . Replace  01 u  with (A20),  10 u  with (A18) 
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(ii) [Aggregate Pools]. The equations for the aggregate pools (A22) – (A24) can be 
derived from the steady state conditions or, as below, from the pool Equations (A17) – 
(A21).  
1. For the pool  ∑
=
− − − ≡
T
i j
j iT E i E u u , in view of  ∑
−
=





j iT E i E i E u u u , the following results 
from (A17) and (A18): 
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so that, in view of Lemma A5 (i) below, the statement follows.   41
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j ET E E u u u , so that the statement 
from (A17) for  0 = i  and (A19) follows. 
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j E T u u u , so that with (A20) 
and Lemma A5 (ii) below, we obtain the following equation: 
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If we replace  00 u  using (A21), the proposition follows. 
 
Proof of Lemma A2. (i) 1. For  E e , we get with  0 = i  from (A13): 
() [] () ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 − − − + + + + + − + + − = E E E E E E E E E E E u u p e R G p e R G e R G p e R G e λ λ λ λ . 
If we replace  1 − + E E u u  using (A22) and (A23) and solve for  1 − E e , we obtain the first line of 
(A25). 
 
2. For  2 , , 1 − = E i K , we obtain the following from (A13), in view of (A22): 
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   () () () () ( ) () ( ) ] ] 1 1 [ [ ] 1 1 [ 1 1 1 i E i E i E i E i E e R G p e a e R G p a − − − − − + − − − − − + − − = λ λ , 
where we make use of (A13) to derive the last equation. Rearranging terms gives: 
  () ( ) () () ( ) ( ) ( ) () 1 1 1 ] 1 1 [ ] 1 1 [ + − − − − − − − − − − = − − + − i E i E i E i E i E i E e R G p a e R G p a e e a λ λ . 
By induction over i, we get:  () () ( ) () 1 1 ] 1 1 [ − − − − − = − − i E i E i E ae e R G p a λ . Replacing the LHS and 
solving for  () 1 + − i E e  gives the second line of (A25). 
 
3. For  1 e  and  1 − = E i ,  0 1 pu e =  results from (A13), with (A24) we get: 










k E k E
k E e R G a p λ . From the last equation, it follows that 










k E k E
k E e R G a p λ . If we solve for  1 e , we get the last 
line of (A17). 
 
(ii) The expression (A26) is derived from (A13) by virtue of (A27) and (A28). 
 
Proof of Lemma A3. In view of (A26) we can write  E i E i E f ε ε − − = . From this, we can 








i i E E E
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i i E f ε ε ε , so that  






















Ψ θ ε . 
Inserting this expression into  E i E i E f ε ε − − =  gives the statement (A29). 
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Proof of Lemma A4. The conditional probabilities  j iT E − − μ  - that an applicant has  i E −  
qualifying points and a residual claim to the UB b of  j T −  periods – directly follow from 
Lemma A1, where we make use of Lemma A5 (i) below. 
 
3. Lemma A5 
Lemma A5. (i) Let  1 1≥ + ≥i T , then the following equation holds: 
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Proof of Lemma A5. (i) 1. Let  0 = i , then clearly () () [] () 1 1 1 1 1
1
0





j j T T p p p γ γ γ  
holds. 
 
2. Assume the statement is true for i, then for  1 + i  and  2 + ≥i T  with 
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it follows that 
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The second summand in the above equation is equal to zero! We prove this statement by 
induction over the benefit duration  2 + ≥i T . Clearly, for  2 + =i T ,  () 1 2 = + i RHS  holds. For 
the conclusion from T to  1 + T , in view of the induction hypothesis, it then holds that: 
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(ii) 1. If  1 + = E T , then  () ( ) 1 = = T LHS T RHS  is true. 2. For the conclusion from T to  1 + T  
we develop the RHS of the Equation (A28): 





















+ − ≡ + ∑ γ    43
()
() () ( )
()
()















+ − + −
=
+ − + −
=
∑ ∑













j E 1 1 1






γ γ  
       ()
E T E T p E















































() 1 + = T LHS . 
 
C. Reservation Income and Rents (Lemma A6) 
With Lemma A6 we convert the guarantee income of the workers and the qualifying rents 
into expressions which depend on the model parameters, the tightness of the labor market 
and the asset values of the occupied jobs. 
 
Lemma A6 (i) [Reservation Income]. 1. The reservation income of a job seeker who 
neither owns qualifying points nor claims for unemployment benefits is: 











z rU . 
2. The value of a job seeker who does not have qualifying points, but still has claims to UB 
after  1 , , − = T E j K  periods of unemployment is: 







j T d b U U
1
00 0 , 















3. For the reservation income of an insider with a qualifying counter equal to  i E − , 
1 , , 1 − = E i K , the following is true  












































4. The value of a job seeker with a current spell of unemployment of length  1 , , − = T i j K  
and  i E −  qualifying points,  1 , , 1 − = E i K , is: 
(A40)       ∑
−
=
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6. A job seeker with a completed qualifying period and residual claims to UB over  j T −  
periods,  T j , , 1 K = , has the value:   44












(ii) [Rents]. 1. From (A39) we get the qualifying rent for a match that makes a transition 
from  () 1 + − i E e  to  i E e −  with: 
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2. Lemma 4, Equation (31), shows that for two workers with a completed qualifying period 
– one is an outsider, the other an insider -, the outsider has the weaker bargaining 
position. The side payment he must accept is given by (A42)  








j ET ET d b U U
1
. 
3. If we compare two workers with  i E −  qualifying points – one is an outsider with a 
residual benefit duration of  j T −  periods, the other is an insider -, then the outsider is 
better off, (see Lemma 4, Equation (31)), because he receives a wage bonus for which, 
with (A40): 
(A45)       ∑
−
=




i E j iT E d b U U
1
0 .  
 
Proof of Lemma A6. (i) 1. The statement follows with  E i = ,  T j =  from the asset 
Equations (A6), (A8) and the sharing rule (A5). 
2. Assume  E i =  and  1 , , − = T E j K  then from the asset Equations (A6), (A8) and the 
sharing rule (A5) we get: 
   () () [] () () () [ ] 1 0 00 1 0 1 1
1
1 1 1
















Replace  ) 1 ( 1 Π  using (A37), and solve the difference equation to derive the statement. 
 
3. From the asset Equation (A8), the sharing rule (27) and the Equation (A6) for the initial 
value of a filled job, we get 


















Solve the difference equation, replace  00 U  with Equation (A37) and the statement follows. 
 
4. With the asset Equation (A8), the sharing rule (A5) and the initial value of a filled job 
(A6) we obtain the following difference equation in the benefit duration  j T − : 
(A46)   ()() [] () () ( ) [ ]
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First, we show that the proposition holds for  1 = − j T . For  1 = − j T , we can derive from 
(A46) that 
   ()() [] () () ( ) [ ]






− − − −




i E i E
i E i E i E









   45




















































































If we substitute the expression in the last brackets with (A39) by  z rU i E − − 0  and rearrange, 
we obtain the statement:  db U U i E i E + = − − 0 1 . For the conclusion from  j T −  to  () 1 − − j T  
we eliminate  j iT E U − −  and  ()j T i E U − + − 1  in (A46) with (A40) and obtain 









k d b . 
 
5. With (A8), (A6) and the sharing rule (14), we obtain the following equation for the 
guarantee value of an insider with a completed qualifying period,  ET U : 
(A47)   () () () ( ) [] 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
− − − + − + + + +
− −
= T E ET E ET U U b z
p
p




To solve the difference equation, we need to know the guarantee value of a job seeker 
with a completed qualifying period and an unemployment spell of one period,  1 − ET U . The 
value  1 1 − − T E U  results from (A40). 
With (A8), (A6), the sharing rule (A5) and the wage Equation (31) we get: 
(A48)   ()() [] () ( ) [] + − +
− − −
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Solve the difference Equation (A48) to obtain: 
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For  0 E U , we get from (A8), (A6), the sharing rule (A5) and the wage Equation (31): 
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Insert (A50) and (A47) in (A49), to obtain the following equation for  1 = j : 
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Inserting (A51) into (A47) the statement follows by virtue of (A39) and (A40).  
6. From (A47) and (A48) we can deduce that   46
(A52)   () ( ) () ] [ 1 ] [ 1 1 1 1 1 1 + − − − − + − − − − − + − = − j T E T E j ET ET j ET ET U U d U U d U U γ γ . 
Solving this difference equation we arrive at: 
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0 1 γ γ γ , 
where  j T m − = . 
For  0 E m ET U U − −  we obtain from (A48), (A50) and (A45): 




























E m ET d d db U U d U U γ γ γ , 
as we will prove by induction over m. For  1 = m , the following results from (A48), (A50) 
and (A45): 
















E ET E ET d db U U d U U γ γ . 
From this equation, we obtain: 


















E m ET E m ET d db U U d U U γ γ . 
The solution of this difference equation gives (A54). 
From (A42), (A47) and (A50) we get:  db U U E E = − 0 1 . Inserting this expression into (A54), 
considering  j T m − = , we get:  ( ) ( ) d d bd U U
j
E m ET − − = − − 1 1 0 . Using this equation in 
(A53) and rearranging terms gives the statement by virtue of (A42), from which: 
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